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The present review intends to provide a neuroscientiﬁc perspective on the ﬂexible (here:
almost instantaneous) adoption of novel goal-directed behaviors. The overarching goal is
to sketch the emerging framework for examining instruction-based learning and how this
can be related to more established research approaches to instrumental learning and goal-
directed action.We particularly focus on the contribution of frontal and striatal brain regions
drawing on studies in both, animals and humans, but with an emphasize put on human neu-
roimaging studies. In section one, we review and integrate a selection of previous studies
that are suited to generally delineate the neural underpinnings of goal-directed action as
opposed to more stimulus-based (i.e., habitual) action. Building on that the second section
focuses more directly on the ﬂexibility to rapidly implement novel behavioral rules as a hall-
mark of goal-directed action with a special emphasis on instructed rules. In essence, the
current neuroscientiﬁc evidence suggests that the prefrontal cortex and associative stria-
tum are able to selectively and transiently code the currently relevant relationship between
stimuli, actions, and the effects of these actions in both, instruction-based learning as well
as in trial-and-error learning. The premotor cortex in turn seems to form more durable
associations between stimuli and actions or stimuli, actions and effects (but not incentive
values) thus representing the available action possibilities. Together, the central message
of the present review is that instruction-based learning should be understood as a prime
example of goal-directed action, necessitating a closer interlacing with basic mechanisms
of goal-directed action on a more general level.
Keywords: ideomotor theory, instrumental learning, instruction, prefrontal cortex, premotor cortex, basal ganglia
Rapidly adopting novel rules deﬁning which actions yield the
desired outcome under different circumstances is a pivotal expres-
sion of humanbehavioral ﬂexibility. For humans themost efﬁcient
way to acquire such novel goal-directed behavior is to make use
of explicit instructions. Imagine an infant girl being told to ﬁrmly
press the biscuit cutter into the dough, then to carefully lift it up
again, and voila there’s a heart-shaped biscuit – hooray – and just
like that a novel goal-directed action emerged by instruction. The
processes that mediate the implementation of novel and explicitly
instructed behavioral rules are central to executive control func-
tion, but research has been surprisingly scarce as already noted
more than a decade ago (Monsell, 1996). Instead, the acquisi-
tion of novel behavioral rules has been studied mostly by means
of instrumental trial-and-error learning procedures. In compari-
son to that, the human capacity of learning by instruction offers
a short-cut for acquiring the same novel behaviors much faster,
thereby minimizing possible harm in case of trying the wrong
action (Doll et al., 2009;Walsh andAnderson, 2011). Only recently
has instruction-based learning started garnering broader scien-
tiﬁc interest (Hommel, 2000; Wenke et al., 2007; Waszak et al.,
2008; Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran, 2009), especially in the cogni-
tive neuroscience domain (Doll et al., 2009; Cole et al., 2010; Ruge
and Wolfensteller, 2010; Dumontheil et al., 2011; Hartstra et al.,
2011; Li et al., 2011; Bugmann, 2012; Ramamoorthy and Verguts,
2012). The present review aims to sketch the emerging frame-
work for examining instruction-based learning in cognitive neu-
roscience and how this can be related to more established research
approaches to instrumental learning and goal-directed action.As a
very ﬁrst step we will deﬁne the key terms and concepts the present
review deals with in a few introductory notes by addressing two
opening questions. First,whatmakes an action-goal-directed?And
second,why study instruction-based learning – or else – is learning
by instruction better than learning by trial-and-error?
WHAT MAKES AN ACTION-GOAL-DIRECTED?
INTRODUCTORY NOTES
In terms of instrumental learning and behavior the execution of
a goal-directed action depends on the rewarding (reinforcing)
properties of its effect (Thorndike, 1911; Colwill and Rescorla,
1986; Dickinson et al., 1996). For instance, your behavior will
be considered goal-directed if you stop performing an action R
(e.g., pushing the buttons on the coffee machine) as soon as you
either do not desire or do not belief that you get the outcome
(O, or effect E) of that action (coffee) anymore (cf. Balleine et al.,
2009). In contrast, your behavior will be considered habitual or
directly stimulus-based (S-R) if your action was not sensitive
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to such reinforcer devaluation and you continued to perform it
regardless. Thus, goal-directed or outcome-based behavior rests
on associations between responses (button pressing) to certain
stimulus situations (coffee machine) and their effects or outcomes
(coffee). Themental representation of such differential action out-
comes (Colwill and Rescorla, 1990; Urcuioli, 2005; Shin et al.,
2010) allows, for instance, selecting among competing alterna-
tive responses (R) that might have been learnt independently for
the same stimulus (S) situation or that might have been learnt to
produce different effects depending on a particular S. In addition
to instrumental learningmechanisms, ideomotor theory proposed
a similar action-effect binding mechanism (see Lotze, 1852; Har-
less, 1861; James, 1890; Greenwald, 1970b; Hommel et al., 2001;
for a recent translation of Harless’ work, see Pﬁster and Janczyk,
2011; for a historical review, see also Stock and Stock, 2004).
According to the ideomotor framework, actions and their per-
ceived effects become integrated such that the mere anticipation
(or idea) of an effect primes the associated motor action, and
likewise the performance of an action goes along with an antic-
ipation of its effect. Interestingly, the frameworks of ideomotor
and instrumental learning have only recently begun to become
more integrated (Butz and Hoffmann, 2002; Elsner and Hom-
mel, 2004; de Wit and Dickinson, 2009; Shin et al., 2010). With
respect to differential action-effects, both have demonstrated that
by incorporating stimulus information, response-effect (R-E) or
response-outcome (R-O) associations can be contextualized (e.g.,
Colwill and Rescorla, 1985, 1990; Kunde, 2001; Ziessler et al., 2004;
Hoffmann et al., 2007; Ruge et al., 2010; Wolfensteller and Ruge,
2011). In other words, the action you will select in a given stimulus
situation depends on the goal you currently pursue. Importantly,
in that sense, any behavior based on instructed S-R rules would
essentially be goal-directed or effect-based at least early in prac-
tice (Dickinson and Shanks, 1995; Killcross and Coutureau, 2003;
Wood and Neal, 2007), because the action is performed in order
to perform correctly as instructed, that is to achieve success and
to avoid the alternative outcome of failure. This implies then that
performing correctly must be intrinsically rewarding as otherwise
the respective action should not be shown. Two recent functional
imaging (fMRI) studies provide direct support for this notion by
showing that the ventral striatum – a central part of the brain’s
reward system – is engaged in processing positive monetary and
cognitive feedback (Daniel and Pollmann, 2010), and is modu-
lated by how conﬁdent of being accurate a person feels (Daniel
and Pollmann, 2012). However, given enough practice you might
very well ﬁnd yourself carrying out an action in a more automatic
manner upon the stimulus at hand without considering the effects
of this action anymore.
Note that due to its focus on instruction-based learning the
present review will not speak to free will related aspects of
goal-directed action1.
1This is an exciting research topic of itself that has inspired a large number of
neuroscientiﬁc studies in recent years. Typically they compare a condition where
participants can freely choose which action to perform or not to perform (free-
choice or self-generated action) with a condition where participants are instructed
which action to perform by an external stimulus (forced-choice or externally trig-
gered action). Converging evidence suggests a crucial role of the pre-supplementary
LEARNING BY TRIAL-AND-ERROR AND LEARNING BY INSTRUCTION:
INTRODUCTORY NOTES
The concept of learning by trial-and-error dates back to the early
days of instrumental learning (e.g., Thorndike, 1911). In a nut-
shell, you realize that your action is correct if it gets reinforced
by monetary reward or positive cognitive feedback in humans, or
juice or food pellets in monkeys and rats. Conversely, you realize
that an alternative action might be correct, if your action leads
to monetary loss, negative feedback, icky-tasting food, electric
shocks, or simply no reward. Depending on the difﬁculty of the
task and the number of response alternatives it might take quite
a while to ﬁgure out what is correct under which circumstances.
In contrast, humans can adopt and behaviorally implement novel
stimulus-response (S-R) rules almost instantaneously if explicitly
instructed. Most experimental laboratories explicitly use this abil-
ity by simply instructing their participants rather than training
them over extensive time periods as is more common praxis in
animal research. But is there direct empirical evidence for the
superiority of instruction-based learning (at least in terms of
time)? Unsurprisingly, the answer is yes. A recent example can be
found in a study on probabilistic learning (Walsh and Anderson,
2011) which showed that with prior instruction (but not without),
behavior started, and stayed at asymptotic level. Thus, instruction-
based learning of novel rules can be considered to be one of the
prime examples of the ﬂexibility of human goal-directed behavior.
Of course, the results of instrumental learning by trial-and-
error and of instruction-based learning approaches will ultimately
converge on a nearly error-free and ﬂuent behavior. Notwith-
standing that, the underlying learning mechanisms are obviously
different and are likely to be reﬂected by distinct learning-related
neuronal processes as indicated for instance by neuropsychological
investigations of human patients (Vriezen and Moscovitch, 1990;
Petrides, 1997). Patients who suffered from lesions within frontal
cortex had difﬁculties learning novel S-R rules irrespective of
whether they received an instruction or not (Petrides, 1985, 1997).
In contrast, patients with basal-ganglia dysfunction were impaired
in learning by trial-and-error, but showed normal performance
levels when learning by instruction (Vriezen and Moscovitch,
1990). When comparing the neurocognitive mechanisms under-
lying trial-and-error learning and instruction-based learning it
is important to distinguish between two processes that are rele-
vant for contingencies between actions and goals to gain control
over behavior. One process is speciﬁcally relevant in the typical
instrumental learning situation and is responsible for extracting
action-goal contingencies from response feedback during trial-
and-error learning. The second process refers to the behavioral, or
pragmatic, implementation of symbolically represented action-
goal contingencies that are explicitly stored in working memory,
or more precisely, as suggested recently, in a “procedural work-
ing memory” sub-system (Oberauer, 2009; Souza et al., 2012).
Notably, it is this second process that deﬁnes instruction-based
motor area for self-generated actions (Jenkins et al., 2000; Lau et al., 2004, 2006;
Mueller et al., 2007; Waszak et al., 2012). A recent in-depth discussion of the con-
cept of self-generated actions can be found elsewhere (Nachev and Husain, 2010;
Passingham et al., 2010; Schuur and Haggard, 2011, 2012; Obhi, 2012).
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learning situations2. For trial-and-error learning, it seems less clear
whether explicit rule knowledge is always generated and used to
support a hypothesis-driven strategic approach to extract the cur-
rently valid contingencies (Haruno et al., 2004; Hadj-Bouziane
et al., 2006; Frank and Badre, 2012). Alternatively or concurrently,
trial-and-error learning might also proceed more implicitly via
reinforcement learning mechanisms based on a gradual trial-by-
trial updating of contingency representations as a function of the
outcome prediction-error (Glascher et al., 2010).
SECTION ONE: THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF
GOAL-DIRECTED ACTION
In this section we review and integrate a selection of previous
studies that are suited to generally delineate the neural underpin-
nings of goal-directed action as opposed to more stimulus-based
(i.e., habitual) action. Most of the studies are based on altering in
one way or the other the integration of goal-information during
learning and beyond either by explicitly manipulating features of
the outcomes that are entailed by speciﬁc actions or by tracking
the transition from goal-directed to stimulus-based (i.e., increas-
ingly habitual) action control. In this section we will integrate
ﬁndings from both, instrumental learning and ideomotor theory
following a recent endeavor of cross-fertilization between the two
closely related but still largely segregated research frameworks (see
also Hommel et al., 2001; de Wit and Dickinson, 2009; Shin et al.,
2010).
APPROACH 1: STUDYING OUTCOME-BASED ACTION CONTROL
Within the instrumental conditioning framework animal lesion
studies have implicated different structures within homologs of
the human basal ganglia and the medial and orbital prefrontal
cortices in the control of goal-directed behavior involving R-O or
S-R-Oassociations as compared to stimulus-based habitual behav-
ior involving S-R associations or “pavlovian” associative processes
linking S and O. In particular, goal-directed actions based on R-O
or S-R-O associations draw on the associative striatum (asSTR)3,
2Neurological case studies again suggest dissociable brain mechanisms for symbolic
and pragmatic representations (Luria, 1973). For instance, after being instructed to
respond to red light by pressing ﬁrmly and to respond to blue light by pressing softly
patients with parietal and frontal lesions are heavily impaired. However, when asked
to continuously verbalize the currently relevant response, the patients with parietal
lesions are able to do so, and most importantly this manipulation also restores the
instructed behavior. In contrast, patients with frontal lesions, while still being able
to verbalize the currently relevant response, fail to correctly translate this declarative
knowledge into overt behavior. These early case reports bear some resemblance to
more recent empirical ﬁndings. One is goal-neglect (Duncan et al., 1996, 2008),
which is the failure to implement a particular aspect of a task despite being well able
to describe it. Another one is utilization behavior originally described in patients
suffering from frontal lobe lesions (Lhermitte et al., 1986), who performed certain
actions such as lighting a match upon seeing it despite being able to verbalize that
they knew it was inappropriate.
3Based on functional and structural differences revealed in rodents, non-human,
and human primates the dorsal striatum is typically divided in two parts. The asSTR
comprises the head of the caudate nucleus as well as the part of the putamen ante-
rior to the anterior commissure while the smSTR comprises the part of the putamen
posterior to the anterior commissure (Ashby et al., 2010). Generally, instrumental
learning research suggests that the asSTRis a relevant structure for learning and
representing response-outcome associations (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi et al.,
2004; Yin et al., 2005; Atallah et al., 2007; Tanaka et al., 2008). By contrast, the
while habitual actions based on S-R associations draw more on the
sensorimotor striatum (smSTR; for reviews, see Yin and Knowl-
ton,2006;Ashby et al., 2010; Balleine andO’Doherty, 2010; van der
Meer and Redish, 2010). By contrast, functional imaging research
uncovering the brain structures involved in goal-directed as com-
pared to stimulus-based behavior in humans is still scarce. The
few imaging studies in humans have used mainly two differ-
ent approaches: one is to use outcome devaluation in order to
investigate how differential outcome values are represented in the
brain (Valentin et al., 2007; de Wit et al., 2009). Complementary,
another approach examines how manipulations of the R-O con-
tingency modulate brain activation (Tricomi et al., 2004; Tanaka
et al., 2008). Naturally, these studies did not attempt to systemati-
cally distinguish between all the different types of associations that
might be formed under instrumental conditioning regimes, that
is, R-O or S-R-O associations as the basis of truly goal-directed
action as compared to S-R habits or pavlovian S-O associations,
but rather selectively contrasted some of these contingencies.
For instance, Tricomi et al. (2004) reported that the asSTR was
speciﬁcally involved in expecting incentive outcomes following an
action (R-O) but not following a predictive stimulus without an
action (S-O). Similarly, learning of S-R-O and S-O association was
differentially related to the asSTR and the ventral striatum, respec-
tively (O’Doherty et al., 2004). Converging evidence stems from
an fMRI study investigating free operant conditioning (Tanaka
et al., 2008), which revealed that high compared to low R-O con-
tingency was associated with stronger engagement in the asSTR
alongside with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Two other studies (Valentin et al.,
2007; de Wit et al., 2009) aimed to dissociate habitual (S-R)
action from effect-based (S-R-O) action. This is an important
endeavor since the activation of goal representations (outcome-
based action control)might be amere epiphenomenon if in accord
with an established S-R habit (stimulus-based action control) as
pointed out for example byWood and Neal (2007).WhileValentin
et al. (2007) employed the classical devaluation paradigm where
response-speciﬁc differential outcomes had incentive values, de
Wit et al. (2009) employed a novel paradigm based on creating
competition between stimulus-based and outcome-based action
control with differential response effects (fruit symbols) bearing
no intrinsic incentive value similar to studies on ideomotor learn-
ing (see section below). More speciﬁcally, the condition targeting
goal-directed action was constructed such that upon presentation
of a particular fruit symbol A, a speciﬁc response would result
in the presentation of the same fruit symbol A (and winning
smSTR seems to be relevant for forming habitual S-R associations (Yin et al., 2004;
Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Atallah et al., 2007; Tricomi et al., 2009). Importantly,
these striatal regions are known to be parts of separate cortico-striato-thalamic
loops (Alexander et al., 1986; Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Grahn et al., 2009). The
associative cortico-striato-thalamic loop links prefrontal and parietal association
areas including dorsomedial and dorsolateral PFC with the asSTR. The sensorimo-
tor cortico-striato-thalamic loop links sensorimotor cortical regions, i.e., premotor
and primary motor cortex, with the smSTR (Yin and Knowlton, 2006). Recent
research suggests interaction between these loops, via connections to the dopamin-
ergic midbrain and to separate yet densely interconnected amygdalar nuclei (Yin
and Knowlton, 2006; Grahn et al., 2009; Pennartz et al., 2011).
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points).The inﬂuence of the stimulus-based action control sys-
tem was tested in a condition where responding to fruit A would
result in the presentation of fruit B while responding to fruit B
would result in the presentation of fruit A (and winning points
in both cases). Thus, in the stimulus-based condition, outcome
anticipation would result in activating the wrong response which
should discourage the goal-directed action mode. Stimulus-based
(or habitual) action control was associated with enhanced acti-
vation in smSTR. Outcome-based action control was associated
with activation in VMPFC in both, de Wit et al.’s and Valentin
et al.’s study despite using quite different experimental protocols.
Notably, de Wit et al. (2009) additionally reported enhanced acti-
vation in dorsal premotor cortex (PMC) for effect-based action
control.We will discuss this latter observation below in the section
on ideomotor action.
While these two studies probed the incorporation of differ-
ential response outcomes independent of its evolution across
S-R learning, a recent study compared conditions with differ-
ential vs. random outcomes during trial-and-error S-R learning
as a function of particularly informative feedback trials (Noo-
nan et al., 2011). The results suggest that VMPFC and adjacent
medial orbitofrontal (OFC) activation reﬂect the subjective value
of expected outcomes, whereas the lateral OFC in co-operation
with ventral striatum might be the region that supports the updat-
ing of S-O and R-O associations during trial-and-error learning.
Together, all three studies support in different ways the original
idea proposed by the differential outcome paradigm that intrinsi-
cally incentive as well as non-incentive action-effect features (e.g.,
Mok and Overmier, 2007) – if they discriminate between differ-
ent actions – are tightly intermeshed with instrumental learn-
ing mechanisms (Trapold, 1970; Urcuioli, 2005). Nevertheless, it
should be noted that sensitivity to differential outcomes in areas
related to reward processes not only when outcomes are intrin-
sically incentive (Valentin et al., 2007), but also when they are
non-incentive (de Wit et al., 2009) or when their incentive value
is only indirectly mediated via tokens (Noonan et al., 2011) might
be due to the fact that all three imaging studies examined rel-
atively early phases of practice. As will be discussed later on,
this might disguise functional differences between non-incentive
action “effects” and incentive action “outcomes.” The following
section will highlight studies that speciﬁcally target goal-directed
actions involving non-incentive action-effects after comparably
long training sessions.
APPROACH 2: STUDYING EFFECT-BASED ACTION CONTROL
Previous imaging studies investigating effect-based action control
in the ideomotor approach provide strong evidence for the bidi-
rectional nature of action-effect associations. The experimental
design typically adopted is a two-step effect-priming procedure
(Greenwald, 1970a; Elsner and Hommel, 2001), where an ini-
tial acquisition phase which contingently paired two freely chosen
responses with two speciﬁc auditory (Elsner et al., 2002; Melcher
et al., 2008) or visual effects (Kühn et al., 2010) is followed by
a test phase. In the test phase, the previously learnt effect (E) is
either presented on its own without a response (Elsner et al., 2002;
Melcher et al., 2008), serves as an unspeciﬁc go-signal for a pre-
viously selected response after a delay (Melcher et al., 2008), or
responses are to be freely chosen but effects are no longer pre-
sented (Kühn et al., 2010). The main ﬁndings are that (i) upon
performing responses that had previously been paired with a
speciﬁc sensory effect, activation was observed in the respective
sensory cortical areas (Kühn et al., 2010) and (ii) upon present-
ing a sensory stimulus that had previously been the effect of
a motor response activation in motor and premotor areas was
enhanced (Elsner et al., 2002; Melcher et al., 2008). Interestingly,
none of these studies report activation in the asSTR, VMPFC,
or OFC for effect-based action control, which contrasts ﬁndings
from instrumental learning discussed above. However, outcome
devaluation studies indicate that the incentive aspect of differen-
tial outcomes becomes ineffective for making response decisions
after some amount of practice beyond the initial instrumental
acquisition phase (Killcross and Coutureau, 2003). By contrast, in
the ideomotor paradigm, differential response effects are typically
“over”-learned across hundreds of trials, yet without losing their
potential to automatically prime response selection later on (Nat-
tkemper et al., 2010). The level of automaticity of R-E associations
most likely explains the absence of activation in the aforemen-
tioned regions in studies testing ideomotor learning. However, it
poses the question as to where else these associations are stored or
represented at that point. A very likely candidate is the PMC, as
indicated by a couple of studies investigating effect-based action
control from quite different angles.
In an ideomotor inspired approach to goal-directed action,
Ruge et al. (2010) investigated the neural correlates of differ-
ential as compared to common response effects during action
planning in a task switching design. Participants had to indicate
either the horizontal or the vertical position of ambiguous targets.
Importantly, two types of feedback were given, one corresponding
to common response effects (correct/incorrect), and one corre-
sponding to differential response effects (coloring of indicated
location). In task switch trials compared to task repetition trials
disambiguation of these differential response effects was necessary.
This disambiguation was associated with enhanced activation in
dorsolateral PFC, PMC and anterior intraparietal sulcus. Based on
their ﬁndings, Ruge et al. (2010) suggested that posterior frontal
regions such as the PMC represent speciﬁc response-effect (R-
E) associations, whereas more anterior lateral prefrontal cortex
(LPFC) regions provide set-level information as to which set of
goals can currently be achieved (visual motion effects to the left
or right vs. up or down). This interpretation nicely ﬁts with two
recent studies in humans revealing the crucial contribution of
the dorsal PMC to action-effect prediction. In an fMRI study, the
dorsal PMC was strongly engaged whenever participants had to
judge whether an ongoing goal-directed action that had temporar-
ily been occluded was correctly continued (Stadler et al., 2011). In
order to reach a correct conclusion, action-effects had to be contin-
uously predicted: starting to reach for some cup should be followed
by grasping it and so on. Temporal disruption of dorsal PMC func-
tionality by means of transcranial magnetic stimulation impaired
participants’ ability to predict action-effects (Stadler et al., 2012).
Corroborating evidence for the role of the dorsal PMC in action-
effect prediction stems from single cell recordings in monkeys.
In these studies, similar neuronal activity was observed when the
monkeys performed an action to reach a particular spatial effect,
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and when they watched the same action (Tkach et al., 2007) or
even just a cursor being moved to reach the same spatial effect
(Cisek and Kalaska, 2004).
As outlined in the section on instrumental learning, it might
be of particular interest to oppose R-E based action control and
more S-R based action control. Though most previous studies on
incidental effect-learning were not speciﬁcally designed for that
purpose, some of them nevertheless offer some valuable insights.
For instance, in one of the experimental conditions in the study
by Melcher et al. (2008) stimulus and effect were incompatible
with respect to the associated response. More speciﬁcally, partici-
pants had to respond to stimuliwhile simultaneously hearing tones
that had previously served as effects of just the opposite response.
Thereby competition was induced between goal representations
activated by the previously learnt but currently irrelevant R-E
association and the currently relevant S-R association. Notably,
under these circumstances enhanced activity in posterior LPFC
was observed. In another recent imaging study participants had
to indicate the middle of a temporal interval using either S-R or
R-E associations (Mueller et al., 2007). In the stimulus-based (S-R)
condition they made a forced-choice, pressing the button spatially
compatible to a visual stimulus presented to the left or right of the
screen center. By contrast, in the effect-based (R-E) condition par-
ticipants could freely choose to press a button depending on where
they wanted the stimulus to appear in the next trial4. Effect-based
action control was associated with comparatively stronger activa-
tion in posterior medial PFC as well as anterior LPFC. However,
it seems noteworthy that the activations reported by Mueller et al.
(2007)might also reﬂect a certain degree of conﬂict between effect-
based and stimulus-based action control because in some cases
the freely chosen goal (next location) and the currently irrelevant
stimulus (spatial location of the stimulus) are incompatible. This
in turn would be in line with the assumption that more anterior
frontal regions provide set-level information, or biasing signals in
case competition arises, or selection of the appropriate action is
more difﬁcult.
To sum up, though the ﬁndings from ideomotor learning
approach are less unequivocal than those from instrumental learn-
ing, several consistencies emerge. In particular, the PFC seems
to be providing goal-information, though the nature of the goal
or effect (non-incentive or incentive) and the nature of response
mode (forced or free) might well determine whether more lateral
or more medial PFC regions are involved. As a quite fundamental
difference,while instrumental approaches also report a distinction
at the level of striatal sub-regions, ideomotor approaches typi-
cally fail to ﬁnd activation in the striatum5. As outlined above,
this most likely reﬂects a particular aspect of the experimental
4A detailed discussion of free- and forced-choice measures of R-E learning is beyond
the scope of this review (see instead Herwig and Waszak, 2009; Pﬁster et al., 2011;
Wolfensteller and Ruge, 2011; Waszak et al., 2012).
5However, the perception of action-effects was associated with enhanced activation
in posterior hippocampus (Elsner et al., 2002; Melcher et al., 2008) which might
establish an indirect link. Rodent studies have revealed hippocampal projections to
the asSTR (see also Voorn et al., 2004; Pennartz et al., 2011). It has been suggested
that the representation and ultimately the behavioral expression of action-effect
contingencies might depend also on the intactness of the hippocampal input to
the striatum possibly providing episodic memory information (Frank et al., 2009;
design typically employed, which is to investigate correlates of R-E
learning after overtraining. Due to the transient asSTR engage-
ment the critical period might be missed. One notable exception
is a recent fMRI study indicating that connectivity between PFC
and asSTR might be inﬂuenced by R-E contingency (Ruge and
Wolfensteller, submitted, see also section two below). Moreover,
ideomotor approaches typically report a differentiation at the level
of the PMC indicating a functional contribution over and above
S-R representations (as would be required in both stimulus-based
and effect-based action control). A potential explanation is that
at least in the case of non-incentive action-effects the PMC rep-
resents all possible S-R-E associations from which a person might
select. In the presence of salient rewards, this potential to select
might be overruled by desirability strengthening the one rewarded
S-R-(E) to such an extent that it resembles an S-R association.
Interestingly, recent single cell recordings of dorsal PMC neu-
rons in monkeys lend support to this notion (Pastor-Bernier and
Cisek, 2011).When presented with one spatial target, the neuronal
response clearly reﬂected the spatial effect preference of the neu-
ron and was not modulated by different incentive values. However,
when two spatial targets were simultaneously presented, neuronal
responses reﬂecting both spatial effects (movement directions)
were observed (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005). Moreover, the neuronal
response for the preferred target was modulated by the relative
difference of incentives associated with the preferred and the non-
preferred target (Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011). Thus, it seems
clear that both, incentive as well non-incentive differential action-
effects play a role for goal-directed action – via distinct mecha-
nisms that are dissociated in terms of the conditions that mediate
their impact on overt behavior and in terms of the underlying
brain systems.
APPROACH 3: STUDYING THE TRANSITION FROM GOAL-DIRECTED TO
STIMULUS-BASED ACTION
As outlined before, it is well established that actions are goal-
directed only at early stages of instrumental conditioning. For
instance, short instrumental training in rats (5 sessions, 50 rewards
in total) resulted in goal-directed behavior as indicated by a reduc-
tion in response rate after devaluation of the outcome (Killcross
and Coutureau, 2003). In contrast, training another response for
a longer period (20 sessions, 500 rewards in total) resulted in
habitual behavior as indicated by the fact that devaluation of the
respective outcome had no impact on the response rate. Typically,
habitual actions are assumed to be solely controlled by the dorsal
PMC and the smSTR whereas the asSTR is assumed to gradually
fade out with progressing automatization (Ashby et al., 2010). This
notion is supported by a large number of studies investigating so-
called conditional motor behavior which requires to form and use
arbitrary associations between stimuli and responses (Kurata and
Wise, 1988; Mitz et al., 1991; Brasted and Wise, 2004; Buch et al.,
2006). In general, these studies highlight the roles of the dorsal
PMC and the smSTR as performance increases. Moreover, the role
of the smSTR in habitual action control was recently also con-
ﬁrmed in an fMRI study in humans. A decrease in smSTR activity
Frank, 2011) in terms of a transient episodic binding of stimulus, response, and
effect (Hommel, 2004).
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was observed after outcome devaluation only after short training
(i.e., when actions control was still driven by goal value) but not
after long training when action control had become more habitual
(Tricomi et al., 2009). Note that some researchers, e.g., Ashby et al.
(2010) hypothesize a further level of automatization, solely relying
on the PMC.
However, based on previous research it is difﬁcult to predict
when and at which rate this automatization might set in as little
is known about the incremental evolution of practice effects on
a shorter time scale, with two notable exceptions. A ﬁrst study
examined rats while they were learning a two-alternative forced-
choice task by trial-and-error (Atallah et al., 2007). After 30 correct
stimulus-response repetitions the impairment of choice behav-
ior induced by reversible deactivation of the asSTR was strongly
reduced (though not completely absent) in the test session, but
not during initial practice. Thus, relative to initial acquisition tri-
als, the rats’ behavior depended much less on the asSTR already
after 30 correct responses, suggesting an early onset of habitual-
ization processes. Contrary to this ﬁnding, single cell recordings
fromasSTRneurons inmonkeys learning a two-alternative forced-
choice task by trial-and-error revealed that asSTR neurons did not
change their rule-selective tuning even after 20 correctly imple-
mented trials (Pasupathy and Miller, 2005). It should be noted,
however, that monkeys had to learn to reverse the previous S-
R mapping for several times, so that these results might not be
comparable to situations were novel S-R mappings need to be ini-
tially learned. Moreover, in contrast to the functional distinction
supported by lesion studies suggesting asSTR for goal-directed
behavior and smSTR for habit-like behavior, recent single cell
recordings in rats indicate that the story might be somewhat more
complex. In these studies, the proportion of neurons encoding
S-R and R-O associations did not differ between the striatal sub-
regions (Stalnaker et al., 2010; Thorn et al., 2010). However, at
the population level, while smSTR activity steadily increases and
correlates with behavioral improvement, asSTR activity declines
after initial consolidation (Thorn et al., 2010). The latter recon-
ciles with the proposed functional roles of asSTR and smSTR in
goal-directed and habitual action control and provides a possi-
ble explanation for the partly inconsistent results discussed above.
While asSTR neurons might stay tuned for the current S-R rule
their relevance for guiding behavior might already be declining as
indicated by deactivation studies. However, it seems necessary to
distinguish between the content represented in the striatal sub-
regions (which might be similar) and their actual inﬂuence on the
PMC and behavioral performance (which seems to vary across
time).
Notably, recent fMRI data in humans suggest that the puta-
men region at the border of asSTR and smSTR might get involved
rather early during trial-and-error learning (Brovelli et al., 2011).
More precisely, activity increased as early as after the second cor-
rect response after having made one to four errors and plateaued
roughly at the fourth correct response. In light of these ﬁndings it
stands to reason that habitualization processes might kick in espe-
cially early when novel behavioral rules are explicitly instructed as
subjects reach asymptotic behavior considerably earlier than when
learning by trial-and-error (Walsh andAnderson, 2011). This once
more underlines that when targeting how learning by instruction
enables goal-directed behavior it is the rapid changes happening
in the very ﬁrst phase that are of utmost interest.
SECTION TWO: BEHAVIORAL FLEXIBILITY AS A PRIMARY
ASPECT OF GOAL-DIRECTED ACTION
This section focuses more directly on the ﬂexibility to rapidly
implement novel behavioral rules as a hallmark of goal-directed
action with a special emphasis on instructed rules. We will discuss
how the frontal and striatal mechanisms identiﬁed in the previ-
ous section might engage in the very beginning of implementing
novel behavioral rules and how they might differ between learn-
ing by instruction and learning by trial-and-error. Finally, we will
highlight some promising recent research approaches and out-
line recent key questions for future research on instruction-based
learning.
INSTRUCTION-BASED LEARNING FROM SCRATCH: THE VERY FIRST
TRIALS
As instruction-based learning is by deﬁnition a rapid process,
this review is generally interested in the initial phase of learn-
ing to implement novel arbitrary S-R mappings. As pointed out
in the introductory notes, it is difﬁcult to directly compare results
obtained from studies examining S-R learning by trial-and-error
and by instruction. The primary challenge in instruction-based
learning is to transfer a symbolic rule representation into its
pragmatic implementation. In trial-error-learning this is, how-
ever, only one possibly relevant aspect. The primary challenge in
trial-error-learning is to extract the correct S-R rule – a process
that is, by deﬁnition, not required in instruction-based learning.
Comparison is even more difﬁcult as it is not even clear whether
and how a symbolic-pragmatic transfer might be essential for
the increasingly better performance across trial-and-error learn-
ing. Moreover, comparison with results from animal studies is
particularly hampered by the fact that learning is typically inves-
tigated in terms of constantly reversing the S-R mapping (but
see Cromer et al., 2011). Nonetheless, we will relate results from
studies on instruction-based learning to the results from selected
trial-and-error learning studies to highlight possible links. This
seems warranted not least to relate instruction-based learning to
the family of studies reviewed above that directly examine the
integration of goal representations during the implementation
of novel S-R rules and which are often based on trial-and-error
learning protocols. Especially, we selected studies that allow draw-
ing conclusions about the evolution of associational strength
between S and R across the initial phase of learning (Eliassen
et al., 2003; Law et al., 2005; Brovelli et al., 2008, 2011; Mat-
tfeld and Stark, 2011) rather than studies focusing exclusively
on the outcome prediction-error (e.g., O’Doherty et al., 2004;
Glascher et al., 2010) or studies that did not focus on individ-
ual learning trials (Toni et al., 2001; Boettiger and D’Esposito,
2005).
But let us ﬁrst turn to the recently published imaging stud-
ies on instruction-based learning. As outlined above, instructed
learning of novel behavioral rules is regarded as a hallmark of
ﬂexible goal-directed action. In the simplest case considered here
subjects may be instructed to implement a two-forced-choice con-
ditional stimulus-response rule like “on red, press left; on blue,
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press right.” Importantly, even if such a task is deﬁned in the
S-R notation, it is clear that a correct response would not at
all qualify as a habitual response, assuming that habitualization
requires at least some amount of practice before behavior is under
strong stimulus control (see previous section). For instance, on
the very ﬁrst implementation trial, if a red stimulus is displayed,
an attentive subject would press left in order to yield correct
feedback (reward) as the desired outcome and to avoid error
feedback (no reward). Of speciﬁc interest for the present review
paper are the processes that support the initial phase of encoding
novel instructions symbolically and the subsequent symbolic-
pragmatic transfer processes immediately after a novel rule has
been encoded.
Behaviorally, there is compelling evidence that mere instruc-
tions can affect behavioral performance. For instance,Wenke et al.
(2007) showed that performance in one task is affected by the
presence of an instruction for a completely unrelated second task
that is to be performed afterward. Similarly, merely instructed S-R
rules can give rise to compatibility effects already in the very ﬁrst
trials of a ﬂanker task (Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran, 2007, 2009).
Also, when responding to bivalent stimuli (e.g., colored shapes),
participants perform worse if they received an S-R rule instruc-
tion for the irrelevant dimension even if they never implemented
it (Waszak et al., 2008).
But how does the brain bring about these almost instantaneous
effects? Generally, recent neuroimaging ﬁndings on instruction-
based learning in humans are consistent with the notion that
(i) the LPFC is critical for the initial encoding of symbolic rule
representations (Cole et al., 2010; Ruge and Wolfensteller, 2010;
Dumontheil et al., 2011; Hartstra et al., 2011) and that (ii) the
initial formation of pragmatic action representations might be
scaffolded by symbolic rule representations transiently buffered
within LPFC-based “procedural” working memory (Ruge and
Wolfensteller, 2010; Hartstra et al., 2011). This was most clearly
demonstrated in the study by Ruge and Wolfensteller (2010) in
which participants were instructed about a novel S-R mapping
linking four stimuli to two manual responses. This was followed
by a short implementation phase spanning the ﬁrst eight repeti-
tions of each of the four stimuli, after which the next of twenty
unique S-R mappings was instructed. Thereby it was possible to
track the gradual transfer from symbolic to more pragmatic rule
representation underlying the actual implementation of instruc-
tions. After an initially strong engagement of the LPFC during
instruction, this area became rapidly less active across the ﬁrst
three to four implementation trials while at the same time poste-
rior PMC and anterior caudate increased their engagement in a
more gradual fashion across the ﬁrst eight implementation trials.
Converging evidence stems from Hartstra et al. (2011) who pre-
sented rule instructions either followed by a target stimulus or not,
in which case the instructions were never actually implemented.
Again, the posterior LPFC was strongly engaged for the merely
instructed but never applied rules but not for rules that had been
implemented multiple times.
Two other recent studies, albeit focusing on hierarchically
higher-level rules offer some interesting parallels, focusing specif-
ically on the encoding of novel vs. practiced task instructions.
Dumontheil et al. (2011) presented participants with a varying
number of rules that had to be combined to develop a novel
task model that was to be applied in the upcoming blocks
of trials. During encoding these individual instructions, poste-
rior LPFC and medial PMC were strongly engaged. Interest-
ingly, in the delay period following instruction activation in
posterior LPFC, medial PMC and anterior PFC increased with
increasing number of rules indicative of uploading the indi-
vidual rules into a more integrated task model. Cole et al.
(2010) provide more direct evidence favoring this explanation by
using a multiple-rule design incorporating an integrative com-
ponent. In particular, each task was constituted by the com-
bination of three different rules. When encoding instructions
for novel rule combinations necessitating the development of a
novel task set as compared to encoding instructions of practiced
combinations, an extensive network of brain regions including
posterior LPFC and PMC was engaged. In contrast, encoding
instructions of practiced rule combinations was associated with
enhanced activation in anterior PFC which was suggested to
reﬂect the long-term memory retrieval of the integrated task
model.
Different from the other instruction-based learning stud-
ies, Ruge and Wolfensteller (2010) observed and again repli-
cated (Ruge & Wolfensteller, submitted) increased practice-
related activation in the posterior PMC and in the asSTR
and nearby ventral striatum. The reason for this study-speciﬁc
ﬁnding might be related to the fact that we tracked repeated
implementations of instructed S-R associations across com-
paratively long trains of eight implementation trials. Differ-
ent from the sharp activation “drop off” within the ﬁrst three
to four practice trials in areas like the LPFC, the activa-
tion increase in asSTR developed in a more gradual fash-
ion across all eight implementation trials. Thus, it seems
necessary to track activation dynamics across several imple-
mentation trials before substantial activation increase can be
detected.
RELATING INSTRUCTION-BASED AND TRIAL-AND-ERROR LEARNING
Generally, the involvement of asSTR and ventral striatum in
instruction-based learning might seem surprising in the light of
previous trial-and-error learning studies that found these areas to
be associatedwith rewardprediction-error signals (e.g.,O’Doherty
et al., 2004; Law et al., 2005; Brovelli et al., 2008;Mattfeld and Stark,
2011) – and clearly in instructed learning the prediction-error
is nearly constant and asymptotically small. However, inspection
of the actual BOLD activation dynamics across the early phases
of both trial-and-error and instruction-based learning suggests
that the respective results can be reconciled. On the one hand,
it is clear that asSTR and ventral striatum are strongly affected
by the current prediction-error value which is maximal roughly
around the time when the learning slope in terms of behavioral
performance is steepest (Brovelli et al., 2011; Mattfeld and Stark,
2011). On the other hand, it is also clear that asSTR and ventral
striatum activations do not return to baseline after performance
has reached nearly asymptotic level (Brovelli et al., 2011; Mat-
tfeld and Stark, 2011). This suggests that these regions keep being
involvedduring the“consolidation”(Brovelli et al.,2011) of already
extracted S-R rules. It is this “pragmatic” consolidation process we
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propose to be reﬂected in the asSTR activation dynamics after
novel rules have been explicitly instructed as observed in Ruge
andWolfensteller (2010). The different learning-related activation
proﬁles – gradual monotonic increase vs. peaking at maximum
learning slope – might simply reﬂect the different forces that
are commonly driving the strengthening of the same pragmatic
rule representations. Striatal learning from instruction is sup-
posed to be driven by symbolic rule representations in LPFC,
causing a trial-by-trial incremental associational strengthening. By
contrast associational strengthening via trial-and-error learning
is by nature discontinuous as it depends on varyingly informa-
tive feedback signals depending on past and present performance
accuracy, thus leading to a modulated associational strengthening
process. In other words, in both learning situations asSTR activa-
tion reﬂects the same associational strengthening, either taught by
LPFC symbolic rule representations or by external error feedback
signals. This does not at all preclude the possibility that learning by
external feedback essentially is mediated via similar LPFC-based
symbolic rule representations that are generated on the ﬂy and
used for hypothesis testing (cf., Haruno et al., 2004; Frank and
Badre, 2012). In fact, comparing learning-related LPFC activation
proﬁles suggests a strikingly similar “drop-off” after instruction
(Ruge and Wolfensteller, 2010) as well as after successful rule
extraction in trial-and-error learning (Mattfeld et al., 2011), hence
corroborating the latter notion.
Finally, the notion that the asSTR is not exclusively sensitive to
prediction-error computations is also supported by recent com-
putationalmodels of prefrontal-striatal interactionsmediating the
inﬂuence of instructed rules on behavioral performance and brain
activation (Doll et al., 2009; Ramamoorthy and Verguts, 2012).
In particular, the model by Ramamoorthy and Verguts (2012)
closely mimics the differential activation time courses of lateral
PFC and asSTR reported by Ruge and Wolfensteller (2010). Con-
sidering increasingly popular accounts of basal-ganglia function
in terms of goal-directed control (see section one above), one
hypothesis is that the asSTR rapidly takes over the role of the
PFC in providing information about the instructed goal struc-
ture, i.e., which response will yield success given a particular
stimulus (Doll et al., 2009; Ramamoorthy and Verguts, 2012).
Thus guidance in terms of what is currently right and what
is currently wrong continues but shifts from explicit symbolic
rule representations buffered in “procedural” working memory
to implicit pragmatic rule representations in the asSTR. As a con-
sequence, working memory resources might be quickly freed to
be used for other tasks at hand. Note that reduced LPFC engage-
ment might not so much indicate a replacement by the asSTR
but rather an increasing co-operation with the asSTR which
might be expressed in stronger functional connectivity between
both areas (Ramamoorthy and Verguts, 2012). In fact, this lat-
ter interpretation is corroborated by our recent data showing
increased functional connectivity between LPFC and anterior
caudate across initial practice (Ruge & Wolfensteller, submitted)
while at the same time LPFC activation decreases. These two
observations together might explain why Meiran and Cohen-
Kdoshay (2012) found that old instructed rules might still linger
in working memory (primarily mediated by frontostriatal interac-
tion) although the symbolic-pragmatic transfer releases working
memory resources (as indicated by decreasing LPFC engagement
on its own).
A SUMMARY ON THE FRONTOSTRIATAL MECHANISMS SUPPORTING
FLEXIBLE GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR
To summarize, current knowledge suggests that LPFC and as STR
are able to selectively and transiently code the currently relevant
relationship between stimuli, actions, and the effects of these
actions in terms of success/reward or failure/non-reward in both,
instruction-based learning aswell as in trial-and-error learning. By
contrast, the involvement of the PMC in both forms of learning
might rather reﬂect the formation of more durable associations
between any contingent occurrences of stimuli, responses, and
effects (Cisek and Kalaska, 2004; Wolfensteller et al., 2004; Tkach
et al., 2007; Melcher et al., 2008; Ruge et al., 2010; Stadler et al.,
2011, 2012), yet without direct reference to current relevance
(Cisek, 2007; Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011). Another functional
difference betweenPMC,PFC,and as STRmight not bewhether or
not goal-information is encoded, but rather by which basal learn-
ing mechanism and when during practice it exerts control over
behavior (Atallah et al., 2007; Doll et al., 2009; Ashby et al., 2010).
It has been suggested that the PMC obeys the laws of Hebbian
learning which implies slowly evolving but enduring representa-
tions (Ashby et al., 2010). One consequence of PMC-based action
coding – provided sufﬁcient practice in a stable environment – is
an unlimited reservoir of alternative action plans of partly over-
lapping S-R-E associations. From the perspective of the PFC, it
would be an enormous beneﬁt if alternative S-R-E associations
were already stored in PMC. Thus, instead of representing the
currently relevant S-R-E association as a whole, as in an early
phase practice, the PFC only has to represent and signal the cur-
rently relevant goal (e.g., E1) which is sufﬁcient to disambiguate
the alternative S-R-E associations stored in the PMC (e.g., E1:
given S1 select R1 instead of R2). Another consequence is that
for implementing novel or changed contingencies between S, R,
and E the PMC needs initial top-down support from PFC and/or
asSTR – two brain regions endowed with more rapidly operat-
ing learning mechanisms to select the one option that is currently
appropriate in terms of success or reward (Miller andCohen, 2001;
Cisek, 2007). More speciﬁcally, the PMC could either rely on the
instantaneous working memory updating capabilities of the LPFC
(Wager and Smith, 2003; Montojo and Courtney, 2008) or on
the rapid updating mechanisms inherent to supervised reinforce-
ment learning on the level of the asSTR (Pasupathy and Miller,
2005).
While these two rapid updating mechanisms might be oper-
ating in parallel when novel rules have to be initially learned,
they seem to be dissociated under reversal learning conditions.
In reversal learning, subjects have to learn that given a particu-
lar stimulus, the previously correct response needs to be replaced
by an alternative response which had previously been associ-
ated with another stimulus (e.g., Cools et al., 2002; Ghahremani
et al., 2010). An obvious functional difference between initial and
reversal learning situations is that reversal learning has to cope
with proactive interference from the previously established S-R-(-
E/O) mapping. Single cell recording in monkeys showed that PFC
neurons were heavily distracted by proactive interference under
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reversal learning conditions whereas caudate neurons were able to
instantly tune into the reversed S-R rule indicating that the asSTR
might be unaffected by previously encoded S-R rules (Pasupa-
thy and Miller, 2005). However, when novel S-R associations are
learnt initially, that is, without the need to reverse a previously
adopted S-R mapping, PFC and caudate neurons seem to operate
in a comparable manner (Cromer et al., 2011). While these lat-
ter single cell recording results suggest that rapid PFC updating
might be hampered due to lingering working memory representa-
tions of the formerly relevant rules, it is an open question whether
this also holds for instruction-based versions of reversal learning
as compared to initial learning and how this compares to recent
ﬁndings under trial-and-error learning conditions (Ghahremani
et al., 2010).
WHAT’S AHEAD FOR INSTRUCTION-BASED LEARNING?
One centralmessage of the present review is that instruction-based
learning should be understood as a prime example of goal-directed
action, necessitating a closer interlacing with basic mechanisms of
goal-directed action on a more general level. In this vein, Ruge
and Wolfensteller (submitted) combined the experimental logics
of tracking instructed behavior over time and the differential out-
come logic as outlined in the previous sections. Speciﬁcally, in
addition to our original design (Ruge and Wolfensteller, 2010)
we manipulated the contingency of effects occurring after correct
responses. Using connectivity analyses, this study provides evi-
dence that the symbolic-pragmatic transfer of newly instructed
S-R rules is accomplished by a rapidly increasing functional inte-
gration between the LPFC and a number of different cortical
and striatal brain regions. LPFC was increasingly coupled with
anterior caudate (including caudate head and ventral striatum),
putamen, and the OFC, areas typically observed in instrumental
trial-and-error learning tasks. This highlights that these areas are
not only relevant when novel instrumental behaviors are learned
via prediction-error signals, that is,when correct responding needs
to be inferred from external feedback (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Daw
et al., 2011), but also when it is learned via explicitly instructed
symbolic rules supposedly stored in the LPFC. Furthermore, stri-
atal areas were dissociated with regard to their sensitivity to
differential outcomes: only the anterior caudate, but not the puta-
men showed a contingency-enhanced practice-related coupling
with the LPFC. This corroborates and extends recent ﬁndings sug-
gesting an early onset of habit formation in the putamen under
trial-and-error learning conditions (Brovelli et al., 2011). Finally,
additional cortical regions (anterior dorsal PMC, anterior IPL)
were sensitive to outcome contingency, suggesting that ideomotor
mechanisms are concurrently involved in the symbolic-pragmatic
rule transfer.
Another recent endeavor is to investigate the inﬂuence of
instructions in contexts that do not give rise to deterministic
context-dependent action-outcome expectancies, but only allow
learning about probabilities (Doll et al., 2009, 2011; Li et al.,
2011). It is then possible to induce and investigate competition
between instructed S-R-O contingencies and those acquired via
experience, i.e., by trial-and-error (Doll et al., 2009, 2011). In these
probabilistic learning tasks participants always had to choose one
stimulus out of several pairs of stimuli. Importantly, the stimuli
differed with regards to the associated reward probabilities. The
critical manipulation is to instruct participants beforehand as
to which stimulus would have the highest reward probability.
Modeling data suggest that the PFC (in co-operation with the
hippocampus) inﬂuences the reinforcement system such that out-
comes consistent with the prior instruction are ampliﬁed. In
contrast, outcomes inconsistent with the instruction which do
occur due to the probabilistic nature of the task are diminished
(Doll et al., 2009). In another recent study Walsh and Anderson
(2011) reported a dissociation of behavioral and neural reliance
on action-feedback. Whereas instructions rendered overt behav-
ior independent from feedback almost immediately, the neural
measure of outcome expectancy (here differences in the negativity
elicited by feedback) evolved only in the course of actual experi-
ence. These ﬁndings would generally be in line with the idea that
reinforcement-related neural structures gain power only after (or
later in) symbolic-to-pragmatic transfer.
SOME QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Although the past two decades have seen an impressive amount
of neuroscientiﬁc research on different aspects of goal-directed
action control, the brain mechanisms underlying the remarkable
human capacity to rapidly implement behavioral instructions are
not fully understood at all. We will name four key issues that in
our view would merit further scientiﬁc investigation. Firstly, how
long and what for is the lateral PFC really needed? Does it play
more of an auxiliary role maintaining instructed rules in proce-
dural working memory? Or is genuinely relevant for the transfer
of symbolic S-R rules into pragmatic rules in PMC irrespective of
active maintenance demands? Secondly, how are the roles of dif-
ferent sub-regions of the basal ganglia and the PFC during early
learning delineated? More speciﬁcally, who teaches whom which
S-R link yields success? Does this possibly depend on how learning
takes place, with the basal ganglia teaching the PFC in the case of
learning by trial-and-error and the PFC teaching the basal ganglia
in the case of learning by instruction? In the ﬁrst case a pragmatic-
to-symbolic transfer might be hypothesized, whereas in the latter
a symbolic-to-pragmatic transfer is necessary. A recent single cell
study by Antzoulatos and Miller (2011) revealed that during sim-
ple S-R learning (i.e., pragmatic-to-symbolic), the dorsal striatum
precedes (andpossible leads) the PFC. In contrast, inmore abstract
classiﬁcation task, after the categories are established, the pattern
is reversed. Now the PFC activation precedes (and possibly leads)
the dorsal striatum putatively indicating symbolic-to-pragmatic
transfer direction. Thirdly, what are the brain activation dynam-
ics that mark the transition of goal-directed to less goal-driven
behavior and more stimulus-based, habit-like modes of action
control? Fourthly, though there is impressive evidence that differ-
ential action-effects are incorporated into action representations,
both behaviorally and on the brain level, neuroscientiﬁc research
on how these goal-relevant action-effect associations are used and
shielded from competing goals is still scarce.
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